Ein Fehler in der ursprünglichen Versammlung der Heere ist im ganzen Verlauf des Feldzuges kaum wieder gut zu machen. 
Introduction
Strategy-proofness is an extensively discussed concept in social choice theory since the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975) , which states that any fair voting rule is susceptible to strategic voting: there always exists a voter who can achieve a more favourable outcome by being insincere. The issue of incentive compatibility seems to be probably even more important in professional sports where contestants have strong incentives to exert costly efforts, and the tournaments involve high-stake decisions that are familiar to all agents (Kahn, 2000) .
All sporting contests should exclude the possibility that a contestant may be strictly better off by a weaker performance. This can immediately lead to tanking (the act of deliberately dropping points or losing in order to gain some other advantage), which is against the spirit of the game but does meet the objective of the contestant. Therefore, it always needs to be considered by administrators, for whom ensuring integrity is a significant part of their job because an ill-thought-out tournament design can easily lead to an outrage among consumers (fans) as illustrated by several historical examples (Kendall and Lenten, 2017) .
The enterprise of exploring sports ranking rules from the perspective of strategyproofness is still in its infancy, and much remains to be done. Some theoretical works find incentive incompatibility as being ranked lower in a given (group) stage might lead to facing a more preferred competitor in the subsequent (knock-out) stage, which means an advantage only in expected terms. For example, Pauly (2014) develops a mathematical model of manipulation in round-robin subtournaments and derives an impossibility theorem, while Vong (2017) considers the strategic manipulation problem in multistage tournaments and shows that only the top-ranked player can be allowed to qualify from each group in order to guarantee that all players exert full effort.
We focus on a probably more serious problem, on the possibility that a player is strictly better off by losing. In other words, a player is allowed to manipulate a match only if it is without any risk. Probably the first academic paper addressing this issue is Dagaev and Sonin (2017) , where tournament systems, consisting of multiple round-robin and knock-out tournaments with noncumulative prizes, are proved to be characteristically incentive incompatible in the sense that a team may be guaranteed to gain (not only in expected terms) by losing instead of winning.
Specifically, we discuss the strategy-proofness of qualifiers to two prominent association football competitions, the FIFA World Cups (in the European Zone) and UEFA European Championships. These qualification tournaments are organised recently such that the top − 1 teams from each group of size ℓ or ℓ + 1 qualify for the final, while the th-placed teams from each group advance to the play-offs, but some of the best th-placed teams qualify or some of the worst th-placed teams are eliminated. Consequently, the th-placed teams -which have not played any matches against each other -should be compared in a so-called repechage group.
Our main contributions are as follows. We prove that the application of the same monotonic ranking for each group including the repechage is not sufficient to guarantee the strategy-proofness of the whole qualification system unless the set of matches considered in the repechage group is chosen appropriately. Theorems listing the sufficient and necessary conditions of incentive compatibility are provided and applied to identify nine recent qualifications that can be manipulated. Finally, we design two mechanisms for solving the problem. It turns out that strategy-proofness can be achieved without sacrificing other important theoretical properties -contrary to other models, for example, matching markets, where incentive compatibility may lead to inefficiency and instability (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009) .
The main message can be interpreted intuitively: to rank a set of teams in different pools on a secondary basis along a common denominator is challenging if the size -or strength, as in the case of Swiss-system tournaments (Csató, 2017b) , but that, being a softer criterion, is not an issue in the current paper -of those pools is not uniform. In finding a way around it, the criteria (each criterion and their order) for ranking these teams in the secondary sense must be identical to that used in the primary sense, in the pools themselves. Otherwise, situations susceptible to manipulation may occur.
The rest of the article is organised in the following way. Section 2 describes our starting real-world observation, the European section of the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification, and presents an incentive incompatible scenario in this framework. Section 3 builds and analyses the formal mathematical model, which is applied to examine the strategy-proofness of some recent association football qualification tournaments in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes policy implications for organisers, while Section 6 concludes. • Group stage (first round): Nine groups of six teams each, playing home-and-away round-robin matches. The winners of each group qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, and the eight best runners-up advance to the play-offs (second round).
• Play-offs (second round): The eight best second-placed teams from the group stage play home-and-away matches over two legs. The four winners qualify for the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
We focus on the first round, where the tie-breaking rules are (FIFA, 2016, Article 20.6 ): (1) greatest number of points obtained in all group matches (with three points for a win, one point for a draw and no points for a defeat); (2) goal difference in all group matches; and (3) greatest number of goals scored in all group matches. Strangely, it is not described explicitly that greater goal difference is preferred. Further tie-breaking rules will play no role in our discussion.
Choice of the eight best second-placed teams is not addressed in FIFA (2016), and we were not able to find the relevant regulation. However, according to a FIFA (FIFA, 2017b) AFC (2015) provides an illustration of how to calculate the ranking of second-placed teams when some group matches are discarded.
The ranking of second-placed teams strictly follows tie-breaking in groups, with the crucial difference of discarding two matches played against the last team of the group. It turns out that this, seemingly minor, modification in the comparison of runners-up has some unintended consequences: we are able to present a possible manipulation of the European qualifiers to the 2018 FIFA World Cup.
Our starting observation has some history in the scientific research. According to our knowledge, the misaligned incentives has been revealed first by a column in the case of the European qualification for the 2014 FIFA World Cup in Brazil (Dagaev and Sonin, 2013) . Dagaev and Sonin (2017, p. 22) Csató (2018) , this is not only an irrelevant scenario with a marginal probability since France had an incentive to kick two own goals on its last match against Israel in the UEFA Euro 1996 qualifying tournament.
Example 2.1. There was a scenario with a (low, but) positive probability in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), after four-fifths of all matches were over, under which Bulgaria might need to play a draw instead of winning against Luxembourg on the last matchday (10 October 2017).
We generate hypothetical results for the last two matchdays, which were played between 5 October 2017 and 10 October 2017, after the example was published (Csató, 2017a) . It is worth noting that all teams play one match home and one away on the last two matchdays, which is not true for two subsequent matchdays chosen arbitrarily.
Eight groups are detailed in Csató (2017a, Appendix). Table 1 shows a possible scenario in Group A. While some results of Table 1 .b may be unreasonable, like Belarus defeating the Netherlands by 7-0, they are necessary to create the appropriate conditions for manipulation. Nevertheless, this set of match results had a positive probability after eight matchdays were over.
On the basis of standings in Group A-I, runners-up are ranked in Table 2 . Only the eight best second-placed teams advance to the play-offs, hence Bulgaria is eliminated.
However, consider what happens if Bulgaria plays a draw of 1-1 against Luxembourg on the last matchday (10 October 2017). It is clear that this change worsens Bulgaria's standing in the group, but it remains the runner-up with 16 points as both Bulgaria and Sweden would have the same goal difference (+4) with Bulgaria scoring more goals in all group matches (22 vs 18). On the other hand, Luxembourg overtakes Belarus thanks to its newly obtained draw because it has more points (9 vs 8). In the ranking of the second-placed teams, matches against the last team are discarded. Consequently, Bulgaria would have 13 points, placing it seventh among the runners-up according to the last row of Table 2 (it has the same goal difference as Greece with more goals scored). Thus Bulgaria would advance to the play-offs instead of Montenegro if it would concede a goal against Luxembourg.
Example 2.1 is robust with respect to Groups B-I. Considering the actual match results in these groups instead of the hypothetical ones, Slovakia is the worst second-placed Thus manipulation mainly depends on the events in Group A because, as it will be revealed by our mathematical model, a successful manipulation has three requirements: (1) the ranking criteria (number of points, goal difference, etc.) of a team should be better among the runners-up by exerting a lower effort in a match; (2) it should preserve the position of the manipulating team in its group; (3) it needs to result in some gain for this team with respect to qualification, for example, by advancing it to the play-offs instead of being eliminated -otherwise, it makes no sense to exert a lower effort. A situation that occurred in the UEFA European Championship 1996 qualification has satisfied the first two conditions (Csató, 2018) .
Theoretical background
In the following, an abstract model is built for the home-and-away (double) round-robin group stage of a tournament organised in a format similar to the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA). It begins with several definitions for the sake of accurateness. We will see in the next section that the seemingly long preparation for the main theorems does not affect the generality of the results. For example, it is not required that a win is awarded by three points, a draw is awarded by one point, and a loss is awarded by zero points.
Definition 3.1. Home-and-away round-robin tournament: Let be a nonempty finite set of at least two teams, , ∈ be two teams and : × → {( 1 ; 2 ) : 1 , 2 ∈ N} ∪ {-} be a function such that ( , ) = -if and only if = . The pair ( , ) is called a home-and-away round-robin tournament.
In a home-and-away round-robin tournament, any team plays each other team in once at home and once at away. Function describes game results with the number of goals scored by the home and the away team, respectively.
Definition 3.2. Ranking in home-and-away round-robin tournaments:
Let be the set of home-and-away round-robin tournaments with a set of teams . A ranking method is a function that maps any function of into a strict order ( ) on the set .
Let ( , ) be a home-and-away round-robin tournament, ( ) be its ranking and , ∈ , ̸ = be two different teams. is ranked higher (lower) than if and only if
Let , ∈ , ̸ = be two different teams and ( , ) = ( 1 ( , ); 2 ( , )). It is said that team wins over team if 
In other words, a win means points, a draw means point and a loss means points.
Definition 3.4. Monotonicity of a group ranking:
Let be the set of home-and-away round-robin tournaments with a set of teams , and be a ranking method. is called monotonic if ( ) > ( ) implies ≻ ( ) for any function and for any teams , ∈ .
Monotonicity does not necessarily lead to a unique ranking, tie-breaking rules can be arbitrary in our model.
Definition 3.5. Group-based qualifier: A group-based qualifier
consists of groups of home-and-away round-robin tournaments with the set of teams 1 , 2 , . . . , such that ∩ = ∅ for any ̸ = , 1 ≤ , ≤ .
In order to cover the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), it is allowed to compare teams from different groups in a repechage group. Definition 3.6. Repechage function: Let be a group-based qualifier. A repechage function associates with any set of group results =
composing the repechage group and a set of opponents ∅ ̸ = 2 ( , ) ⊆ ∖ { } for each team of the repechage group ∈ 1 ( ).
Definition 3.7. Impartiality of a repechage function: Let be a group-based qualifier. Repechage function is impartial if:
• , ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) implies ∈ 2 ( , ) and ∈ 2 ( , );
and ∈ 2 ( , ), ̸ = implies ∈ 2 ( , ); and
According to the impartiality of a repechage function: (a) the number of teams relegated to the repechage group from a given group is fixed; (b) if two teams of the repechage group have played some matches against each other, then these are considered in the repechage group; (c) if two teams are relegated to the repechage group from the same group, then their matches played against any third team should be uniformly considered or discarded in the repechage group; and (d) the number of matches taken in the repechage group into account is the same for all teams of the repechage group. The last condition ensures that the number of points is a plausible measure of performance. 
The number of points is calculated on the basis of group matches considered in the repechage group. The outcome of any qualification system ( , , ℛ) is reflected by the allocation rule ℛ. It implies the following.
Remark 3.1. Let ( , , ℛ) be any qualification system. If there is no difference in the allocation of teams in the repechage group, that is, ℛ( , ) = ℛ( , ) for all teams , ∈ 1 ( ), then the qualification system can be described without a repechage group, thus 1 ( ) = ∅ can be assumed without loss of generality. Definition 3.13. Monotonicity of a qualification system: Let ( , , ℛ) be a qualification system. It is called monotonic if:
• the repechage function impartial;
• there exists a common monotonic ranking in each group such that , ∈ , 1 ≤ ≤ and ≻ ( ) implies ℛ( , ) ≥ ℛ( , ); and
• there exists a monotonic repechage ranking such that , ∈ 1 ( ) and
The idea behind a monotonic qualification system is straightforward. Impartiality of the repechage function provides the comparability of teams taken from different groups. Because of the application of a monotonic ranking in groups, teams have no incentive to exert a lower effort in any match, they cannot achieve a higher position in the group by deliberately playing worse. It is also required in the repechage group, so the repechage ranking should be monotonic. Proof. There is = 9 groups and given any set of group results = { 1 , 2 , . . . , 9 }, all criteria of Definition 3.13 hold:
• the repechage function is impartial (Definition 3.7):
◇ the repechage group consists of the runners-up: ∈ ∩ 1 ( ), 1 ≤ ≤ 9 if and only if
; ◇ the matches played against the first five teams of the group are considered in the repechage group: for each ∈ ∩ 1 ( ), 1 ≤ ≤ 9, ∈ 2 ( , ) if and only if ∈ and
• the group ranking is monotonic because the number of points is the first tie-breaker in groups (Definition 3.6), and:
◇ the first-placed team in each group qualifies: ℛ( , ) = 2 for each ∈ if and only if ∈ : ≻ ( ) ;
◇ the third-, fourth-, fifth-and sixth-placed teams in each group are eliminated:
• the repechage ranking is monotonic because the number of points is the first tie-breaker in the repechage group (Definition 3.10), and:
◇ the eight best second-placed teams advance to the next round: ℛ( , ) = 1 if ∈ 1 ( ) and
⃒ ≤ 7; and ◇ the lowest-ranked second-placed team is eliminated: ℛ( , ) = 0 if ∈ 1 ( ) and ≻ ( ) for all ∈ 1 ( ) ∖ { }.
Now we turn to the issue of incentive compatibility. 
Manipulation in a group means that team improves its position with respect to qualification by letting its opponents score more goals. 
Permutation of group results is illustrated by the following example. Our main contribution concerns the strategy-proofness of groups in a monotonic qualification system. It is summarized in Figure 1 . For the first condition, see Remark 3.1. According to the second requirement, if a permutation of group results does not affect the relegation of a given team to the repechage group, then its set of matches carried over to the repechage group should remain the same. The last condition of Theorem 3.1 means that if a team is considered in the repechage group, then either all or none of its matches played against higher or lower teams are taken into account in the repechage group.
Proof. a) Monotonicity of group ranking ensures incentive compatibility. b) Since 2 ( , ) = 2 (¯, ) for team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) under any sets of group results ,¯, monotonicity of group ranking and repechage ranking ensures incentive compatibility. c) Any team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) is not able to change the set of its matches to be discarded in the repechage group, therefore monotonicity of group ranking and repechage ranking ensures incentive compatibility.
The message of Theorem 3.1 in practice will be discussed later. 
Then this group with the set of teams is manipulable, consequently, the monotonic qualification system ( , , ℛ) violates strategy-proofness.
The requirements of Theorem 3.2 are explained in Figure 1 , too, as this result goes in parallel with Theorem 3.1.
Proof. For the sake of simplicity, we provide an example for a group with four teams | | = 4, where the second-placed team can manipulate its group. }︁⃒ ⃒ ⃒ = 1, the runner-up is relegated to the repechage group. Since there is a difference in the allocation of teams in the repechage group (the first requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds), the results in other groups can be chosen such that the second-placed team can manipulate this group if its results considered in the repechage group improve.
Let ∈ ∩ 1 ( ). The following cases are possible as the second condition of Theorem 3.2 holds: 
, that is, only the matches played against the top team count in the repechage group. Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness: note that
}︁
, and
the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 does not hold.
, that is, only the matches played against the third-placed team count in the repechage group. Consider the results given in Table 3 .a. The number of points for each team is ( ) = 4 + + , ( ) = 3 + 2 + , ( ) = + + 4 , and ( ) = + 2 + 3 , so ≻ ( ) ≻ ( ) ≻ ( ) due to the monotonicity of the group ranking . Furthermore, team has + points in the repechage group. However, if¯= except for¯( , ) = {loss} instead of ( , ) = {win}, then¯( ) = ( ) = 4 + + ,¯( ) = 2 + 2 + 2 ,¯( ) = 2 + + 3 , and¯( ) = ( ) = + 2 + 3 , so ≻ (¯) ≻ (¯) ≻ (¯) due to the monotonicity of the group ranking . Team has now + > + points in the repechage group, therefore it can manipulate its group. Note that
the third requirement of Theorem 3.2 holds.
, that is, only the matches played against the fourth-placed team count in the repechage group. Consider the results given in Table 3 .b. The number of points for each team is ( ) = 4 + + , ( ) = 4 +2 , ( ) = +2 +3 , and ( ) = + +4 , so ≻ ( ) ≻ ( ) ≻ ( ) due to the monotonicity of the group ranking . Furthermore, team has + points in the repechage group. However, if¯= except for¯( , ) = {loss} instead of ( , ) = {win}, then ( ) = ( ) = 4 + + ,¯( ) = 3 + 3 ,¯( ) = ( ) = 1 + 2 + 3 , and¯( ) = + + 3 , so ≻ (¯) ≻ (¯) ≻ (¯) due to the monotonicity of the group ranking . Team has now 2 > + points in the repechage group, therefore it can manipulate its group. Note that
, that is, the matches played against the top team are discarded in the repechage group. Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness: note that
, that is, the matches played against the third-placed team are discarded in the repechage group. Consider the results given in Table 3 .b and the alternative results¯from Case III . The analysis of Case III remains valid, but team has in the repechage group 2 + 2 points under and 3 + points under¯, respectively, therefore it can manipulate its group. Note that
, that is, the matches played against the fourth-placed team are discarded in the repechage group. Consider the results given in Table 3 .a and the alternative results¯from Case II . The analysis of Case II remains valid, but team has in the repechage group + 2 + points under and 2 + + points under¯, respectively, therefore it can manipulate its group. Note that
VII. 2 ( , ) = ∖ { }, that is, no matches are discarded in the repechage group. Condition c) of Theorem 3.1 provides strategy-proofness: note that
Strategy-proofness is guaranteed by monotonicity in the case of two teams. Manipulation in a group with three teams can be shown by the introduction of further tie-breaking rules, it is left to the reader. Furthermore, if tie-breaking rules (goal difference, head-tohead results, fair play conduct etc.) are also considered in Definitions 3.4 and 3.10, then = (a win and a draw have the same worth) or = (a draw and a loss have the same worth) can be allowed.
Nevertheless, these are uninteresting cases in practice since discarding the results against an opponent if there are only two of them is difficult to justify. Even though there are tournaments with groups of three teams and a repechage group, like the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League C, matches are ignored only for groups with four teams in the ranking of third-placed teams.
It is clear that the number of teams in the group, and the position of the team relegated to the repechage group can be modified in Example 3.2 without changing the essence of the proof.
It can be realized from Figure 1 that there is a gap between Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 when the set of matches carried over to the repechage group depend on the results, but not only on the group ranking. Such a qualification system is rather theoretical but it clearly demonstrates the richness of our model contrary to its seemingly restrictive conditions.
Proposition 3.2. Let ( , , ℛ) be any monotonic qualification system. Consider a group with the set of teams such that the following conditions hold:
• there is a team relegated to the repechage group, that is, | ∩ 1 ( )| > 0;
• there exists a team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) such that its set of matches considered in the repechage group depends on group results , that is, 2 ( , ) ̸ = 2 ( ( ), ) for at least one permutation of group results satisfying ∈ ( ∩ 1 ( ) ∩ 1 ( ( ))); and
• there exists a team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) such that its set of matches considered in the repechage group does not depend only on the group ranking, that is, there exist sets of group results ,¯with ≻ ( ) implying ≻ (¯) for all teams , ∈ , but 2 ( , ) ̸ = 2 (¯, ).
Then it is uncertain whether the group with the set of teams is strategy-proof or not.
Proof. An example is provided for both cases.
Example 3.3. Consider the monotonic qualification system ( , , ℛ) of Example 3.2 with 2 ( , ) = {︁ ∈ :
, that is, only the matches played against the top team count in the repechage group, but if there exists a team ∈ such that 1 ( , ) > 1 ( , ) and 2 ( , ) < 1 ( , ) for all ∈ , ̸ = (team loses all of its matches), then 2 ( , ) = {︁ ∈ :
, namely, only the matches played against the fourth-placed team count in the repechage group.
The monotonic qualification system ( , , ℛ) of Example 3.3 is incentive compatible. First, if only the matches played against the top team count in the repechage group (there exist no team losing all of its matches), then 2 ( , ) cannot be modified by the second-placed team ∈ through exerting a lower effort. Second, if the matches played against the fourth-placed team, which loses all of its matches, count in the repechage group, then the second-placed team ∈ has no incentive to cheat because it carries over the maximal number of points (2 ) to the repechage group. Example 3.4. Consider the monotonic qualification system ( , , ℛ) of Example 3.2 with
, that is, the matches played against the fourth-placed team are discarded in the repechage group, but if there exists a team ∈ such that 1 ( , ) < 2 ( , ) and 2 ( , ) > 1 ( , ) for all ∈ , ̸ = (team wins all of its matches), then 2 ( , ) = {︁ ∈ :
}︁ , namely, the matches played against the top team are discarded in the repechage group.
The monotonic qualification system ( , , ℛ) of Example 3.4 can be manipulated similarly to Case VI in the proof of Theorem 3.2 because no team has won all of its matches there.
Note that a similar gray zone emerges in the analysis of Dagaev and Sonin (2017) . Proof. The scenario presented in the Example 2.1 shows that team Bulgaria = ∈ 1 can manipulate its group since there exist sets of group results = { 1 , 2 , . . . , 9 } and = {¯1, 2 , . . . ,
, where team Luxembourg = ∈ 1 and ℛ( , ) = 0 < 1 = ℛ(¯, ). Theorem 3.2 can also be applied due to Proposition 3.1: the qualification system is monotonic, ℛ( , ) can be 0 or 1 if team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ) is in the repechage group, | ∩ 1 ( )| = 1, and for each team ∈ ∩ 1 ( ), 2 ( , ) depends only on the ranking in the group with the set of teams , furthermore,
Theorem 3.2 proves the incentive incompatibility of 2014 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), too, which has already been shown by Dagaev and Sonin (2013) .
The allocation rule ℛ of the model above does not distinguish teams that advance to the subsequent round. This is not a problem if the next round is seeded randomly (like in the UEFA Euro 2000 qualifying) or on the basis of an exogenous ranking of the teams that cannot be manipulated by exerting a lower effort in some matches (like FIFA World Rankings used in the case of 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)). However, if, for example, the highest ranked teams of the repechage group are placed in the first pot before the seeding, then position in the repechage group counts and the qualification system may become incentive incompatible.
Discussion
It is known from Dagaev and Sonin (2013) and Corollary 3.1, respectively, that the 2014 and 2018 FIFA World Cup qualifications (UEFA) do not satisfy strategy-proofness. Further qualifications to the recent FIFA World Cups in the European Zone (World Cup (UEFA)) and UEFA European Championships (UEFA Euro) are analysed with respect to this property in Table 4 .
The UEFA European Championship has been held every four years since 1960. The qualifications for the tournaments between 1960 and 1992 can be described without a repechage group, so they were strategy-proof due to condition a) of Theorem 3.1. The same result provides the incentive compatibility of the 2004 and 2008 qualifying.
The UEFA Euro 2020 qualifying is linked with the 2018-19 edition of the UEFA Nations League, which gives teams a secondary route to qualify for the final tournament. This Table 4 The second-placed teams in the four groups containing five teams directly qualified together with the two best second-placed teams in the three groups containing only four teams.
2
Group 5, originally containing six teams, ended up with five after Yugoslavia was suspended.
3
One team was advanced to an intercontinental play-off.
4
The runner-up of Group 2 was drawn randomly for an intercontinental play-off.
format is not covered by our theoretical model, but it also violates strategy-proofness according to Dagaev and Sonin (2017, Proposition 2) as the qualification system essentially consists of two parallel round-robin tournaments.
3
The first incentive incompatible FIFA World Cup qualifications in the European zone was the 1998 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA). The 2002 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) again satisfied strategy-proofness due to the lack of a repechage group (see condition a) of Theorem 3.1).
Despite the 1990 and 1994 FIFA World Cup qualifications (UEFA) were incentive compatible, their fairness seems to be questionable: the second-placed teams qualified automatically only from certain groups in the first case, and all second-placed teams qualified but group sizes varied in the second case (some qualifications before the 1990 event suffered from the same problem). It is clear that strategy-proofness is a narrower concept than fairness, see Guyon (2017) for an examination of the latter through the example of the 2016 UEFA European Championship. Hence, one can even say that administrators sacrificed fairness for the sake of strategy-proofness.
Proposition 4.1. Qualifications to the 1996 , 2000 , 2012 UEFA European Championships as well as to the 1998 , 2006 , 2010 , 2014 Cups in the European Zone were incentive incompatible.
Proof. It immediately follows from Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 (consider Table 4 ).
The list is far from exhaustive. We mention here only the elite round of the 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification and the 2017 UEFA European Under-21 Championship because they may give inspiration for scientific papers in the future.
Proposition 4.1 carries a disconcerting message for the administrators of FIFA and UEFA: they could be responsible for a potential scandal occurring in a recent qualification. For example, in October 2017, as shown in Section 2. It would be especially disturbing because Luxembourg would have practically no incentive to interfere with the manipulation of Bulgaria in order to prevent the elimination of Montenegro, furthermore, Luxembourg might have even interested in scoring a goal to be the fifth in the group.
Fortunately, such an outcome has not materialized, and we do not know about any attempt to strategically manipulate these qualifications in the way presented above. Probably the closest case was France against Israel in the 1996 UEFA Euro qualifying, where France would have better measures among runners-up if it had scored two own goals (Csató, 2018) .
Strategy-proof mechanisms
We think the lack of dishonest behaviour in the history of qualifications does not reduce the importance of strategy-proofness in practice, especially if it can be achieved without significant rule changes. For instance, in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), the root of the problem resides in discarding the matches played against the sixth-placed teams in the ranking of runners-up. The greatest pity about this situation is that it could have been straightforward to avoid by UEFA ditching the strange policy of ignoring some group matches since all groups had six teams following the admission of Gibraltar and Kosovo.
Yet the administrators chose not to modify the rules. According to a UEFA News (UEFA, 2017), released on 10 October 2017, after the end of group stage: "[. . . ] the exclusion of results against sixth-placed teams was retained to alleviate any possible imbalance between the qualifying groups caused by the late introductions of Gibraltar and Kosovo". While it is respectable to prevent some mathematically unprovable imbalances between the groups, this decision sacrificed the much more clear and important theoretical issue of incentive compatibility.
It seems to be necessary to suggest incentive compatible designs in order to argue against the rules of recent qualifications. Denote the number of teams by , and the number of groups by . Let ≡ mod such that 0 ≤ < and ℓ = ( − )/ ∈ Z. We are looking for strategy-proof qualification systems on the basis of Theorem 3.1.
Definition 5.1. Mechanism A: eliminating the repechage group
The optimal case is to create groups of equal size, like in the UEFA Euro 2004 qualifying (see Table 4 ). However, it may conflict with divisibility, this solution cannot be followed if > 0.
Another possibility is that all second-or third-placed teams either qualify or advance to the next round regardless of group sizes. For example, the UEFA Euro 2008 qualifying was strategy-proof as the top two teams in each group qualified, despite the fact that a group was larger than the others, which may be unfair (see Table 4 ).
Mechanism A provides incentive compatibility because of condition a) of Theorem 3.1.
Definition 5.2. Mechanism B: matches to be discarded in the repechage group are independent of group results
While social choice theory usually wants to avoid the violation of anonymity at all costs, it makes sense to consider this solution because of the seeding procedure. If teams are ranked on an external basis (such as FIFA World Rankings from a given month), there would be teams in Pot 1, teams in Pot 2, and so on, until Pot ℓ with < < 2 (as in the UEFA Euro 2008 qualifying) or Pot ℓ + 1 with ≤ (as in the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA)) teams is formed. Since the last pot is responsible for the difference of group sizes, it seems to be fair to discard the matches played against the team(s) from the last pot in the repechage group.
For the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA), it means fixing in advance that matches played against the teams in Pot 6 (Luxembourg, Andorra, San Marino, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Malta, Liechtenstein, as well as the lately introduced Gibraltar and Kosovo) are ignored in the comparison of the runners-up. Since only Luxembourg and Georgia obtained a better (the fifth) position in the qualification, this policy does not make much difference in practice.
Nevertheless, a problem may arise when a team from the last pot is relegated to the repechage group due to its unexpectedly good performance in the qualifiers. 4 The unlikely scenario can be immediately solved by discarding the matches played against the team from the penultimate pot for this particular team, which does not affect strategy-proofness. Mechanism B provides incentive compatibility because of condition b) of Theorem 3.1.
Definition 5.3. Mechanism C: all or none matches played against higher and lower ranked teams are considered in the repechage group If group sizes vary because of > 0, and the th-placed teams of the groups are considered in the repechage group, then only their matches played against higher ranked teams can count in the repechage group as the cardinality of the set of teams that are ranked lower than them in their group is different. It means no problem when:
a) The qualification is centred around relegation: in the 2018-19 UEFA Nations League C, 15 teams are divided into one group of three teams and three groups of four teams each such that the three fourth-placed and the worse third-placed teams are relegated to League D. In the comparison of third-placed teams, only the matches played against the teams ranked first and second in the group count.
Since there is at most one team ranked lower than the team relegated to the repechage group in each group, they cannot manipulate by changing their set of matches to be ignored.
b) A high proportion of participating teams qualify: in the 2018 European Men's Handball Championship Qualification Phase 2, the contestants were split into seven groups of four teams each such that the top two ranked teams from each group and the best third-placed team qualified for the final tournament. In the comparison of third-placed teams, only the matches played against the teams ranked first and second in the group counted.
Mechanism C provides incentive compatibility because of condition c) of Theorem 3.1.
Mechanism C guaranteed the strategy-proofness of the 2016 UEFA European Championship with a uniform group size (Guyon, 2017) , too, where third-placed teams were ranked on the basis of all group matches.
Definition 5.4. Mechanism D: new seeding policy
The idea behind mechanism C can be applied with a slight modification of the seeding procedure, by a bottom-up design of the pots as follows instead of the usual top-down approach. First, the worst teams form Pot ℓ + 1, the next teams Pot ℓ, and so on until Pot 1 with teams is seeded. Then groups are created by drawing a team from each pot, and − groups are created by drawing a teams from each pot except for Pot 1. The top teams qualify from the groups of size ℓ + 1, and the top − 1 teams qualify from the − groups of size ℓ. The repechage group consists of the ( + 1)th-placed teams from the groups of size ℓ + 1, and the th-placed teams from the − groups of size ℓ, where they are compared on the basis of their matches played against the ℓ − teams that are ranked lower in their groups. Consequently, the matches played against the already qualified teams are discarded in the repechage group, which seems to be reasonable.
Mechanism D provides incentive compatibility because of condition c) of Theorem 3.1.
It is also possible to organise a preliminary round for lower-ranked teams, either a round-robin such as in the CEV qualification for the 2018 FIVB Volleyball Men's World Championship, or a two-leg playoff, similarly to the 2018 FIFA World Cup qualification -AFC First Round. However, it may be difficult to implement this solution given the constraints of the crowded match calendar.
The design of the 1990 FIFA World Cup qualification (UEFA) guarantees strategyproofness, too: the runner(s)-up or third-placed team(s) to be directly qualified (eliminated) are chosen from the groups containing more (fewer) teams without discarding any matches. However, this format may be judged as dishonest, see Section 4.
To summarize, it is clear that mechanism A is perfect in the case of = 0. However, its fairness seems to be questionable if is not divisible by .
Mechanism C leads to discarding a high proportion of matches in the repechage group for the qualifications presented in Table 4 , which may result in increased randomness. It means a problem in a qualification for a final tournament with huge financial issues at stake -for example, all teams were guaranteed at least USD 9.5 million each for their participation in the 2018 FIFA World Cup (FIFA, 2017a) .
Consequently, we suggest considering mechanisms B or D if uniform group size cannot be guaranteed in a qualification. Both are general, that is, they can be directly applied for arbitrary values of and , and they coincide with mechanism A if = 0.
Conclusions
The optimal design of sports tournaments is an important theoretical problem of economics (Szymanski, 2003) and operations research (Scarf et al., 2009) . Tournament organisers may face unpleasant situations when they miss analysing strategy-proofness as the potential costs of tanking can be enormous even if it is often a low-probability event. We have demonstrated that decision makers have chosen a risky strategy in the case of qualification tournaments to some recent FIFA World Cups and UEFA European Championships, and suggested two alternative mechanisms in order to guarantee incentive compatibility.
There are at least three possible directions for future research. First, a number of other tournament designs can be investigated from the perspective of strategy-proofness. Second, the current theory-oriented investigation can be supplemented by estimating the probability of manipulation with the use of historical and Monte-Carlo simulated data. Finally, our two general incentive compatible mechanisms can be compared.
Hopefully, this paper reinforces our view that the scientific community and the sports industry should work more closely together in studying the effects of potential rules and, especially, rule changes, even before they are implemented. For example, the governing bodies of major sports may invite academics to identify possible loopholes in proposed regulations in order to prevent future scandals.
